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NOTES
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN
THE CORPORATE CONTEXT-UPJOHN
Co. V. UNITED STATES
PJOHN is an American corporation that manufactures and sells
pharmaceuticals in the United States and abroad.' Early in 1976
an independent audit produced evidence that one or more of
Upjohn's foreign subsidiaries had made illegal payments to foreign gov-
ernment officials in an attempt to procure that government's business. 2
Upjohn's general counsel subsequently initiated a confidential internal in-
vestigation to discover which subsidiaries had made the payments and to
prepare for potential litigation concerning the corporation's possible crimi-
nal or civil liability.3 The investigation included questionnaires requesting
information from all foreign general and area managers concerning the
illegal payoffs, as well as interviews with corporate officers and employ-
ees.4 Upjohn voluntarily submitted a report to the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice disclosing the payments,5 whereupon the IRS began an investigation to
determine the tax consequences of the questionable payments.6 In late
1. Brief for Petitioners at 3, Upjohn Co. v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 667, 66 L. Ed. 2d
584 (1981), reprinted in 13 L. REPRINTS, TAX SER. (BNA), No. 2, at 281, 299 (1980-1981
Term) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioners].
2. Id
3. Id
4. A letter accompanying the questionnaire informed the managers that the investiga-
tion was beins conducted by corporate counsel at the request of the chairman of the board.
The information requested was based upon promises of confidentiality. Full and complete
responses were required concerning the following matters: (1) payments within the subsidi-
ary relating to the direct or indirect channeling of funds under the company's control to or
for the benefit of any official or employee of a government agency or facility; (2) payments
made through the subsidiary relating directly or indirectly to any funds under the company's
control, to or for the benefit of any candidate for political office or any party during the
period under investigation; (3) any payments of funds under the company's control made by
the subsidiary or any of its employees that were not reflected on the subsidiary's official
company financial and accounting books and records; and (4) payments that were recorded
on the official company financial and accounting books and records in accounts, the pur-
poses and descriptions of which did not accurately reflect the transactions. Petition for Writ
of Certiorari at 41a-42a, Upjohn Co. v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 677, 66 L. Ed. 2d 584
(1981), reprinted in 13 L. REPRINTS, TAX SER. (BNA), No. 2, at 1, 91-92 (1980-1981 Term)
[hereinafter cited as Petition for Certiorari].
5. The report was a copy of one sent to the Securities and Exchange Commission. The
corporation evidently was attempting to police itself and thus voluntarily compensate for its
employees' violations. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 4.
6. Id
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November 1976 the IRS issued a summons7 requesting records relating to
Upjohn's internal investigation, "includ[ing] but not. . . limited to written
questionnaires sent to managers of the Upjohn Company's foreign affili-
ates, and memorandums or notes of the interviews."'8 Upjohn refused to
produce the completed written questionnaires or any memoranda or notes
of the interviews, asserting that such a request violated the attorney-client
privilege.9 The United States District Court for the Western District of
Michigan ordered Upjohn to comply with the IRS summons. 0 The dis-
trict court's decision was affirmed in part by the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, "l and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held,
reversed and remanded: Communications between corporate general
counsel and any corporate employees are deemed protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 677, 66 L. Ed.
2d 584 (1981).
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIRCUIT DIVERGENCE:
CONTROL GROUP VERSUS SUBJECT MATTER
The attorney-client privilege 12 has long been recognized by the courts. 13
7. The summons was issued in accordance with I.R.C. § 7602, which gives the IRS
authority to discover and enforce discovery concerning matters determining the tax liability
of any party.
8. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 4, at 18a. Upon request, Upjohn previously had
provided the IRS with lists of all persons the corporation had interviewed concerning the
payments as well as the names of all persons who had responded to the questionnaire. Brief
for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 5.
9. Upjohn also claimed that the IRS's request violated the work-product doctrine. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). See generally 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 2016-2028 (1970).
10. The decision of the court was based primarily upon the recommendation of a mag-
istrate. 101 S. Ct. 677, 682, 66 L. Ed. 2d 584, 590 (1981). The opinion and orders of the
court are reproduced in Petition for Certiorari, supra note 4, at 171a.
11. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1225 (6th Cir. 1979). The court of
appeals ruled that the attorney-client privilege did not apply "[tlo the extent that the com-
munications [questionnaires and interview notes] were made by officers and agents not re-
sponsible for directing Upjohn's actions in response to legal advice ...for the simple
reason that the communications were not the 'client's.'" Id at 1225. The circuit court thus
afforded the adoption of the control group test as the standard for determining the scope of
the privilege in the corporate context, but reversed the lower court finding that the work-
product doctrine was not applicable to these particular administrative seminars. The court
subsequently remanded the case for a determination of which communications sought by
the IRS were made by members of the control group, denying enforcement of the summons
with regard to such control group communications. Id at 1224. In their partial affirmance,
however, the court rejected the magistrate's finding that the attorney-client privilege had
been waived by voluntary disclosure to the SEC. Id at 1227.
12. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 2292-2329 (Mc-
Naughton rev. ed. 1961). The attorney-client privilege provides that:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought, (2) from a professional legal
adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that pur-
pose, (4) made in confidence, (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance perma-
nently protected, (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser,
(8) except the protection be waived.
Id § 2292, at 554. See also United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-
59 (D. Mass. 1950).
13. See, e.g., Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457 (1876), one of the
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The purpose of the privilege is to encourage clients to make unequivocal
disclosures to their attorneys so that they may render informed legal ad-
vice.' 4 It is designed to protect the client from counselor betrayal and ex-
tends to all legal matters, whether administrative, civil, or criminal. 15 The
privilege generally is granted if the asserted holder of the privilege is or has
sought to become a client, and if the person to whom the communication
was made was acting in his representative capacity as an attorney.' 6 The
communication must be related to the securing of legal advice or serv-
ices, 17 and the privilege cannot be invoked solely to prevent disclosure of
the communication to proper authorities.' 8 Although federal statutes or
rules have never specifically applied the attorney-client privilege to corpo-
rate entities, the courts historically have recognized its application to
corporations. ' 9
.4. The Control Group Test
Because a corporation generally is composed of many individuals, spe-
cial problems arise when it asserts the attorney-client privilege in the cor-
porate context. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 20 first
presented the question of how to apply the privilege to a corporation. The
district court held that only those members of the "control group" consti-
tuted the client,2' and thus only they would be afforded the attorney-client
earliest cases in which the Supreme Court discussed the attorney-client privilege. See also
Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888). For a general survey of the history of the privilege,
see Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV.
1061 (1978).
14. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 458 (1876).
15. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391 (1976); United States v. Louisville & N.R.R., 236 U.S. 318 (1915); Hunt v. Blackburn,
128 U.S. 464 (1888). See generally Hazard, supra note 13; Miller, The Challenges to the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 49 VA. L. REV. 262 (1963). See also ABA MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon No. 4, EC 4-1 to -6, DR 4-101.
16. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass.
1950). See also United States v. Boffa, No. 80-36 (D. Del. Apr. 3, 1981) (privilege extended
to confidential communications made in mistaken but genuine belief individual is an
attorney).
17. 89 F. Supp. at 358.
18. See Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 547-48
(D.D.C. 1970); In re Natta, 264 F. Supp. 734, 741 (D. Del. 1967), aft'don other grounds, 388
F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1968); Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18
F.R.D. 463, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F.
Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1954).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Louisville & N.R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915) (explicitly
recognizing that attorney-client privilege extends to corporations as well as individuals). See
generally Barnham, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Arena, 24 Bus. LAW. 901
(1969); Note, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege.- Culpable Employees, Attorney Ethics,
andthe Joint Defense Doctrine, 58 TEXAS L. REV. 809, 810 n.3, 812 n.12 (1980); Comment,
The Privileged Few.- The Attorney-Client PrivilegeAsApplied to Corporations, 20 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 288 (1972). See also Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
20. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
21. Id at 485. To be privileged, a communication to an attorney must be made by the
attorney's client. See note 12 supra.
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privilege. 22 The court determined that an employee is a member of the
control group only if he "is in a position to control or even to take a sub-
stantial part in a decision about any action which the corporation may
take upon the advice of the attorney."' 23 The standard articulated by the
Westinghouse court now is recognized as the control group test. Subse-
quent case law suggested a fivefold rationale justifying its use: (1) it was
most easily applied by the courts; (2) it was most easily understood and
adhered to by attorneys; (3) it was most likely to be deemed reasonable by
the parties; (4) it allowed for the greatest amount of discovery; and (5) it
was most congruent with the traditional purposes of the attorney-client
privilege.24 After Westinghouse the Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits
adopted the control group test as the basic standard for applying the attor-
ney-client privilege to corporations. 25
While ease of application seemed to be the most appealing factor in lim-
iting the corporate attorney-client privilege only to the control group, sev-
eral subsequent cases presented peculiar factual settings that created some
difficulties in applying the test.26 Most notable was the basic problem of
22. 210 F. Supp. at 485.
23. Id. The court further limited the control group test by requiring that the employee's
authority to participate in and affect a contemplated decision must be actual as opposed to
apparent.
24. See Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397
(E.D. Va. 1975). For other cases articulating a rationale for the control group test, see
United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1227 (6th Cir. 1979); In re Grand Jury Investi-
gation, 559 F.2d 1224, 1236-37 (3d Cir. 1979); Jarvis, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 84
F.R.D. 286, 291 (D. Colo. 1979). See also Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Cli-
ents: The Control Group Test, 84 HARV. L. REV. 424 (1970); Note, supra note 19, at 813-16;
cf. In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 386-87 (D.D.C. 1978) (control group
test modified and rationale redefined).
25. See United States v. Amerada Hess Corp., 619 F.2d 980 (3d Cir. 1980); United
States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599
F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968); Congoleum Indus.,
Inc. v. GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (by stipulation), aff'dmem. 478 F.2d 1398
(3d Cir. 1973); Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal. 1963). See
also Note, supra note 24, at 435 (endorsing application of control group test).
Only one state has made an attempt to implement the conservative control group test
through the avenue of appellate decision. See Day v. Illinois Power Co., 50 Ill. App. 52, 199
N.E.2d 802, 806 (1964) (employee making alleged confidential statement must be in control
to activate privilege). This ruling was seriously undermined, however, by the Illinois
Supreme Court's decision in Cox v. Yellow Cab Co., 61 Ill. 2d 416, 337 N.E.2d 15, 18 (1975)
(refusing to attack the privilege question directly but citing to the California case of D.I.
Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 388 P.2d 700, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1964),
as authority for standard of application). See note 49 infra. The Illinois Supreme Court has
yet to respond definitively to the corporate privilege standard. See COMMITTEE ON RULES
OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMI-
NARY DRAFT, PROPOSED FED. R. EVID., art. V, rule 5-03 (1969), reprinted in 46 F.R.D. 161,
249-50 (1969). The control group test later was deleted from the proposed Rules of
Evidence.
26. See Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 145-46 (D. Del. 1977) (privilege
extended beyond control group where scientific information required by attorney could be
obtained only from research department); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F.
Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1974) (control group standard partially abandoned in decision requiring
that communication be ancillary to request for legal opinion); Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Air-
craft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117 (M.D. Pa. 1970) (context of patent infringement action creates
difficulties in defining specific members of the control group).
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determining who should be included within the undefined control group
itself.27 Courts and commentators expressed concern over extending the
attorney-client privilege too deep within the corporate structure, thereby
creating a "zone of silence" that might impede judicial inquiry.28 Gener-
ally, however, courts applying the control group test restricted the privilege
to the uppermost echelons of corporate management.
29
In In Re Grand Jury Investigaion30 the Third Circuit articulated a theo-
retical basis for limiting the attorney-client privilege to the upper echelon
control group. In this case questionable foreign payments were the subject
of a corporation's in-house investigation. General counsel questioned
thousands of employees located in a number of foreign nations concerning
the allegedly illegal payments. 31 The corporation asserted that the com-
munications between counsel and the employees were privileged. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals held they were not.32 The court identified
three overriding policy considerations in applying the attorney-client privi-
lege to corporations: (1) the need to encourage open communication and
full disclosure between attorney and client; (2) the need to minimize the
potential pejorative influence of any corporate privilege standard upon the
factflinding process; and (3) the need for confidentiality in investigations. 33
The court concluded that lower-level employees not maintained within the
control group would confide in corporate counsel regardless of whether the
privilege was applicable, and thus refusing to make such communications
privileged would not impede full attorney-client disclosure or confidential-
ity.34 Furthermore, limiting the privilege's application would minimize its
adverse effect on full judicial inquiry.35 Since the control group test was
consonant with these three basic policy needs, the Third Circuit reasoned
that no sound rationale justified extending the attorney-client privilege any
deeper within the corporate structure than necessary.36 The Third Cir-
cuit's decision thus emphasized the balance between facilitating communi-
cations to in-house counsel and simultaneously avoiding the obstruction of
27. See Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
28. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1979); Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 929 (1963); Kobak, The Uneven Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Corpora-
tions in the Federal Courts, 6 GA. L. REV. 339, 365-66 (1972); Simon, The Atorney-Client
Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953, 955-56 (1956).
29. See Congoleum Indus., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82, 85 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (con-
trol group includes corporate vice presidents, division vice presidents, and general manag-
ers); Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515, 518 (S.D. Cal. 1963) (control
group includes directors, officers, department heads, division managers, and division chief
engineers).
30. 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979).
31. Id at 1227.
32. Id at 1237.
33. Id at 1236-37.
34. Id at 1236.
35. Id at 1235.
36. Id at 1237. Subsequent decisions following the holding and reasoning of In re
Grand Jury Investigation include United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1226-27 (6th
Cir. 1979); Jarvis, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 84 F.R.D. 286, 290 (D. Colo. 1979);
United States v. Lipshy, 492 F. Supp. 35, 43 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
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legitimate discovery through an overapplication of the privilege. 37
B. The Subject Matter Test
In spite of the adoption of the control group test by many courts, 38 the
standard was heavily criticized by commentators.39 One of the most fre-
quent criticisms was that the test failed to recognize the basic reality of the
corporate structure, namely, that lower-level employees not in the control
group frequently are the only practical source of information for corporate
counsel. The limited scope of the control group test thus impeded and
discouraged full disclosure and investigation.40 In Harper & Row Publish-
ers, Inc. v. Decker41 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals refused to adopt
the control group test and instead adopted the subject matter test as the
standard to be applied to the attorney-client privilege in the corporate con-
text. Rather than limit the corporate attorney-client privilege to the eche-
lon in control, the Seventh Circuit allowed the privilege to be extended
freely throughout the corporate structure.42 The Harper & Row court rea-
soned, contrary to the rationale of the control group theorists, that lower-
level employees were "sufficiently identified with the corporation" so that
a communication made from any member of the corporation to the gen-
eral counsel constituted a communication from "client" to attorney, sub-
ject to two additional criteria: 43 first, the employee must have made the
communication at the direction of his controlling superiors, and secondly,
the subject matter about which the attorney was seeking information must
have dealt with the employee's performance of his on-the-job duties.44
The subject matter test thus greatly expanded the earlier control group test.
The court in Harper & Row, however, failed to articulate any rationale for
its holding. Neither did the court indicate precisely how far down the cor-
porate ladder the attorney-client privilege would or should extend under
the subject matter test. Moreover, while expressly rejecting the control
37. 599 F.2d at 1236-37. The In re Grand Jury investigation, unlike the Upjohn investi-
gation, encompassed thousands of employees located in a number of foreign nations. If the
court had found the in-house questionnaires to be privileged, an SEC investigatory team
would have been forced into the position of bearing the effort and expense of discovering
this information on their own. By ruling that only the control group may exercise the privi-
lege, the court alleviated an extreme pretrial discovery burden on the SEC.
38. See notes 24-25, 28-29 supra.
39. See commentaries cited in Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 608
(8th Cir. 1977) (en banc); Kobak, supra note 28; Weinschel, Corporate Employee Interviews
and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 12 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 873 (1970); Comment, The
Application in the Federal Courts of the Attorney- Client Privilege to the Corporation, 39 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 281 (1970); Note, Privileged Communications-Inroads on the "Control Group"
Test in the Corporate Area, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 759 (1971). See also Maurer, Privileged
Communications and the Corporate Counsel, 28 ALA. LAW. 352, 375 (1967); Note, The Attor-
ney- Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting- A Suggested Approach, 59 MICH. L. REV. 360,
373-74 (1970).
40. See authorities cited note 39 supra.
41. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), afd mem. by an equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 348
(1971).
42. 423 F.2d at 491-92.
43. Id at 491.
44. Id
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group test as "not wholly adequate, ' 45 the Seventh Circuit did not analyze
the subject matter test in its relation to the control group test.46 In spite of
its deficiencies, however, the Harper & Row decision marked the first ma-
jor departure from the strict limits of the original control group test.47
The Eighth Circuit in Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith48 adopted a
modified version of the subject matter test as articulated in Harper &
Row.49 The court rejected the control group test on the grounds that it
equated corporate cients with individual clients and thus ignored the real-
ities of the corporate structure.50 The court required, in addition to the
Harper & Row test, that: (1) the parties attempting to utilize the privilege
must bear the relationship of attorney to client; (2) the attorney must have
been consulted specifically for the purpose of obtaining legal advice; and
(3) the communication was not disseminated beyond those individuals
who needed to know of its contents.5 ' The Diversified court recognized the
45. Id.
46. Id. Noting that the control group test had at that time fallen under some criticism,
the court rested its decision primarily upon a string citation of cases and law reviews. See id
47. Subsequent decisions adopting the subject matter standard of application as pro-
nounced in Harper & Row include: United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 86 F.R.D.
603, 621 (D.D.C. 1980); Xerox Corp. v. IBM Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 377-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1165 (D.S.C. 1974); Hasso v.
Retail Credit Co., 58 F.R.D. 425, 428 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
48. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
49. A clear majority of state decisions has consistently favored application of the more
liberal subject matter test. See, e.g., Jay v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 340 So. 2d 456, 457-58
(Ala. Civ. App. 1976) (attorney's disclosure of corporate employee's statement violated at-
torney-client privilege); D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 736, 388
P.2d 700, 709, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468, 477 (1964) (lower-level employee communication privileged
if made in confidence to obtain corporate legal advice); Texaco, Inc. v. Phoenix Steel Corp.,
36 Del. Ch. 456, 264 A.2d 523, 524 (1970) (adopting United Shoe Machinery standard); Wise
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 178 A. 640, 644 (Del. Super. Ct. 1935) (agent's statement to
rincipal in anticipation of litigation privileged); Fire Ass'n v. Fleming, 78 Ga. 733, 737-38,
S.E. 420, 422-23 (1887) (rule excluding confidential communication between attorney and
corporate client extends to agent of either); Schuitt v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 2 N.W.2d 413,
416 (1942) (corporate employee's communications to attorney in preparation for trial
deemed privileged); State ex rel Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Flynn, 363 Mo. 1065, 257 S.W.2d
69, 73 (1953) (privilege extends to documents prepared by employee at direction of employer
for use in litigation); Lindberg v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 525 S.W.2d 571, 572 (Mo. Ct. App.
1975) (corporate manager's report of accident privileged); State ex rel. Union Oil Co. v.
District Court, 160 Mont. 229, 503 P.2d 1008, 1012 (1972) (corporate manager's confidential
statements to in-house counsel protected by privilege); Exparte Schoepf, 74 Ohio St. 1, 77
N.E. 276, 279 (1906) (fact that employer kept employee witness's statement confidential acti-
vated privilege); Jackson v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 27 Utah 2d 310, 495 P.2d 1254, 1257
(1972) (adopting United Shoe Machinery standard); Robertson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va.
520, 25 S.E.2d 352, 360 (1943) (employee is client if confidential statement made to employer
with intent to transfer it to attorney for litigation); Horlick's Malted Milk Co. v. A. Spiegel
Co., 155 Wis. 201, 144 N.W. 272, 276 (1913) (conversation of employee to company officer
and/or attorney protected by privilege); accord, A. v. District Court of Second Judicial Dist.,
191 Colo. 10, 550 P.2d 315, 323 (1976) (court endorses broad statement in Radiant Burners,
Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 322 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929
(1963), that privilege exists without regard to whether client is a corporation), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1040 (1977).
50. 572 F.2d at 608. The court emphasized that although the control group test was the
predominating standard at that time, the control group theory nevertheless had been the
subject of increasing criticism. Id; see note 39 supra.
51. 572 F.2d at 609.
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difficulty of deciding whether or not parties for a given communication can
be classified as "attorney" or "client." 52 Noting the divergence of opinion
among the circuit courts in consistently and adequately articulating which
members of the corporation constituted the client, the Diversified court
nevertheless based its definition of the "client" upon the imprecise defini-
tions in Harper & Row. 53 Thus, while providing these additional criteria
in modifying the subject matter test, the court failed to articulate a more
practical standard of application.
The Eighth Circuit, not unlike the Seventh Circuit, did not specify pre-
cisely who among a corporation's employees could potentially activate the
attorney-client privilege in the corporate context. The implication sur-
vived both the Harper & Row and Diversified decisions, however, that any-
one employed by the corporation who responded to a confidential
investigation by in-house counsel at the direction of a superior concerning
an occurrence within the scope of employment could claim protection of
the privilege, regardless of employment status. Nevertheless, the modified
subject matter test of Diversfied was preferable to the vague standard of
Harper & Row because it provided a greater degree of protection against
indiscriminate over-application of the privilege to lower-level corporate
employees. The holding in Diversfied subsequently was adopted by a
number of district courts.54
Endorsement of the subject matter test by the Seventh and Eighth Cir-
cuits openly conflicted with the control group decisions of the Third, Sixth,
and Tenth Circuit Courts. 55 Other circuits either had not addressed the
question of the standard to be applied or implicitly had endorsed versions
of both tests in dicta.56 Upjohn Co. v. United States thus presented an
opportunity for the Supreme Court to resolve the circuit divergence con-
cerning application of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate
context.
52. Id at 602.
53. Id; see text accompanying notes 42-46 supra.
54. See, e.g., Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. Lemay, 89 F.R.D. 410, 413 (S.D.
Ohio 1981); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 621 (D.D.C. 1980);
Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re D.H. Overmyer
Telecasting Co., 470 F. Supp. 1250, 1254 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See generall, Note, supra note 19,
at 816 (noting that "the momentum of new decisions" is in the direction of the subject matter
test). See also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 510-11 (2d Cir. 1979) (Second
Circuit implies it would follow modified subject matter standard if presented with issue);
Mead Data Central, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 253 n.24 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (D.C. Circuit implies, in a dictum, that it would follow modified subject matter
test if necessary); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 385 (D.D.C. 1978)
(privileged communication must be reasonably believed to be necessary to obtain sound
legal advice).
55. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
56. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 510-11 (2d Cir. 1979); Mead Data
Central, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 253 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1977); In
re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 385 (D.D.C. 1978); note 54 supra. See
also Note, supra note 19, at 809 n.2.
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NOTES
II. UPJOHN Co. V UNITED STATES
In Upjohn Co. v. United States the Supreme Court confronted the ques-
tion of how far to extend the attorney-client privilege within the corporate
structure. The Court ruled that communications between general counsel
and corporate employees, regardless of those employees' classification as
control group members, were protected by the attorney-client privilege.5
7
Consequently, the IRS summons58 could not be used to compel Upjohn to
disclose the content of communications between its lower-level employees
and corporate counsel.5 9 The Court thus adopted the subject matter test 60
and expressly overruled the control group test.6 ' Rejecting the Sixth Cir-
cuit's rationale that a broader application of the attorney-client privilege
might make discovery excessively burdensome and create a "zone of si-
lence" that would inhibit full investigation,62 the Supreme Court con-
cluded that application of the attorney-client privilege to communications
similar to those in Upjohn placed the adversary in no worse position than
if the communications had never taken place. 63 Thus the privilege only
protects disclosure of the actual communication but not disclosure of the
background facts known to the employee who cooperated in the investiga-
tion.64 The Court concluded that it is the control group test, not the sub-
57. 101 S. Ct. at 685, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 595; see note 4 supra.
58. See notes 7, 8 supra and accompanying text.
59. 101 S. Ct. at 685, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 595.
60. See notes 38-54 supra.
61. 101 S. Ct. at 684, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 593. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
stated that "[t]he control group test adopted by the court below thus frustrates the very
purpose of the privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant information." d.
The Court also ruled that the work-product doctrine applies to IRS summonses. 101 S.
Ct. at 686-87, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 596; see note 9 supra. Emphasizing the strong public policy
supporting the work-product doctrine, the Court ruled that even though the government
might suffer inconvenience and incur expenses in tracking down the 86 interviewees scat-
tered around the world, such inconvenience and expense do not outweigh the protective
policies of the work-product doctrine. 101 S. Ct. at 686-87, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 596. Noting that
the IRS summons for attorney's notes of oral interviews with clients in UpJohn is precisely
the type of material intended to be protected by the work-product doctrine, the Court ruled
that an IRS summons for attorney's notes of an oral interview will not be enforced. Id at
688, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 598. The Supreme Court thus ruled for the first time that the exception
to the work-product doctrine of substantial need and without undue hardship does not apply
to attorney-prepared memoranda based upon the oral statements of client interviews. Id at
686, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 596. The Court refused to address the issue of precisely what standard
of necessity, if any, must be met in order to overcome the work-product privilege as applied
to notes of oral interviews with clients. Id at 688, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 598-99. Instead, it re-
manded the case to the district court for a determination of the question consistent with the
Court's opinion.
62. 101 S. Ct. at 685, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 595. The Sixth Circuit had argued that the privi-
lege did not apply based on the theory that lower-level employees did not constitute a client
in the context of the privilege. 600 F.2d at 1225, 1227.
63. 101 S. Ct. at 685, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 595.
64. Id. The Court's ruling reemphasized the traditional rule that the attorney-client
privilege applies to specific communications, not factual knowledge:
A fact is one thing and a communication concerning that fact is an entirely
different thing. The client cannot be compelled to answer the question, "What
did you say or write to the attorney?" but may not refuse to disclose any rele-
vant fact within his knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement of
such fact into his communication to his attorney.
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ject matter test, which frustrates the essential purpose of the privileged
attorney-client relationship.65 Because middle and lower-level employees
often are the ones who possess the necessary information the corporate
attorney requires, the Court reasoned that limiting the privilege to the con-
trol group and excluding corporate employees with potentially relevant in-
formation would complicate and impair the attorney's ability to convey
frank legal advice to the upper echelon members who ultimately are re-
sponsible for implementing corporation policy.66 Justice Rehnquist stated
that the control group test is simply too difficult to apply consistently and
emphasized the need for a standard that would provide greater prospective
predictability for attorneys and corporate clients alike.67
In ruling in favor of the subject matter test, however, the Upjohn Court
"decline[d] to lay down a broad rule or series of rules to govern all con-
ceivable future questions in this area."'68 Noting that privilege decisions
must be determined on a case-by-case basis, 69 the Court emphasized the
narrowness of its holding by reciting the specific facts and circumstances of
the case being decided. 70
The Court concluded its discussion of the privilege issue by emphasizing
that while the extension of the privilege protects disclosure of specified
communications, the attorney-client privilege could not be used as a cloak
to hide disclosure of underlying facts that may have been the subject of the
communication. 7' Thus, the IRS itself could interview the employees who
responded to the corporate questionnaire. 72 Such discovery is not pre-
vented even by an expansive version of the subject matter test. The inves-
tigating party, however, must bear the cost and burden of such discovery. 73
The decision in Upjohn represents the Supreme Court's first attempt at
Id
65. Id at 684, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 593; see 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2290. See also
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403
(1976); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888).
66. 101 S. Ct. at 684, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 593.
67. Id., 66 L. Ed. 2d at 593-94.
68. Id at 681, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 589. Justice Rehnquist prefaced his opinion with the
caveat that "[wle are acutely aware. . . that we sit to decide concrete cases and not abstract
propositions of law." Id
69. Id at 686, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 595.
70. Id at 688, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 598. These facts and circumstances included the follow-
ing: the communications were made to counsel acting in their legal capacity, at the direction
of corporate managers, to obtain legal advice; the subject matter of the communications
pertained to the employees' duties; the questionnaire identified the investigators as legal
counsel; and the employees were fully aware of the legal nature of the investigation. Id
71. Id at 685-86, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 595.
72. The IRS, in fact, had interviewed at least 25 of the 86 individuals involved in the
investigation at the time of the Upjohn decision. Id at 686, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 595. Seven of
the other 86 Upjohn employees interviewed by general counsel in the investigation were no
longer employed by the corporation at the timge of the IRS interviews. As the question
concerning whether or not the communications of these seven individuals is to remain privi-
leged after termination of employment was not addressed at the trial level or in the circuit
court, the Supreme Court declined to decide the issue in Upjohn. Upjohn had argued that
such communications should indeed be deemed protected. Id at 685 n.3, 66 L. Ed. 2d at
594 n.3.
73. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). As Justice Jackson noted in his con-
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resolving the circuit divergence over the proper standard for judging a cor-
poration's invocation of the attorney-client privilege. The significance of
the Court's rejection of the control group test, however, eventually may be
minimized by its refusal to apply the subject matter test beyond the specific
facts of Upjohn .74 The Court's repeated qualification of its decision 75 may
encourage those circuit courts favoring the control group test to continue
development of their own corporate privilege standards by distinguishing
Upjohn on factual grounds.76 Although the Court criticizes the control
group test as unpredictable and uncertain in application,77 its endorsement
of the subject matter test that is expressly limited to specific facts is not
likely to provide an appreciably greater standard of predictability or cer-
tainty of application. If the circuit courts distinguish Upjohn consistently
on a factual basis and continue to adhere to the control group test, as Jus-
tice Rehnquist's opinion so readily invites them to do, the essential signifi-
cance of Upjohn eventually may be its own insignificant effect. 78
curring opinion in Hickman, "[d]iscovery was hardly intended to enable a learned profes-
sion to perform its functions ... on wits borrowed from the adversary." Id at 516.
74. Chief Justice Burger concurred with the majority, objecting only to the Court's fail-
ure to promote a more certain standard of application. 101 S. Ct. at 689, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 600.
"I believe that we should articulate a standard that will govern similar cases and afford
guidance to corporations, counsel advising them, and federal courts." Id at 689, 66 L. Ed.
2d at 599. Burger concluded that the Court had abdicated its responsibility to provide future
guidance and predictability within the law, since the opinion "neither minimizes the conse-
quences of continuing uncertainty and confusion nor harmonizes the inherent dissonance of
acknowledging uncertainty while declining to clarify it within the frame of issues
presented.' Id at 689, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 600.
75. See notes 67-70 supra and accompanying text.
76. For example, the IRS summons in Upjohn was initiated solely by Upjohn's
voluntary filing with the SEC and the IRS. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
Upjohn clearly was attempting to self-police its own operations. If a situation arose where a
corporation was instead caught by the IRS making illegal foreign government payoffs, a
court favoring the control group test might use this fact to distinguish Upjohn. In addition,
Upjohn involved communications with a finite group of only 86 employees. If a situation
arose involving thousands of undefined employees, as in In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599
F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979), Justice Rehnquist's opinion certainly does not make clear that the
subject matter test would be mandated in such a situation. See note 37 supra. Finally, the
IRS argued that Upjohn's submission of the results of the investigation to the SEC consti-
tuted a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. The Court, however, never addresses the
issue. This unanswered question could be a factor that might sway future decisions arising
under similar circumstances and effectively would penalize the corporate entity for self-po-
licing and honest revelation. See note 11 supra.
77. 101 S. Ct. at 684, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 593.
78. The courts have historically predicated their decisions concerning the attorney-cli-
ent privilege upon the specific facts of disparate factual contexts. See S. REP. No. 93-1277,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 ("the recognition of a privilege based on a confidential relationship
.. . should be determined on a case-by-case basis"). See also United States v. Gillock, 445
U.S. 360, 367 (1980); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980).
Recent cases in the wake of Upjohn cast some doubt on the precedential value of the
decision. See Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. Lemay, 89 F.R.D. 410, 413 (S.D. Ohio
1981) (criticizing Upjohn decision for failing to provide clear guidelines for applying attor-
ney-client privilege in corporate context, but applying privilege because factors in Upjohn
also found in the present case); Marriott Corp. v. American Academy of Psychotherapists,
Inc., 277 S.E.2d 785, 792 (Ga. 1981) (citing Upjohn but adopting the Diversified subject mat-
ter test on different grounds); Leer v. Chicago, St. P. & Pac. R.R., 308 N.W.2d 305, 309 n.8
(Minn. 1981) (court declines to apply privilege to communications between employee who




In Upjohn Co. v. United States the Supreme Court rejected the control
group test for applying the attorney-client privilege to corporations and
instead adopted the subject matter test as the prevailing standard. Balanc-
ing the long-revered tradition of attorney-client privilege against the needs
of adversary discovery, the Court ruled that the specific facts of this case
justified extending the privilege to all middle and lower-level employees.
The Upjohn communications were made: (1) to the general counsel;
(2) at the direction of corporate superiors in order to obtain legal advice
from general counsel; (3) based upon a promise of confidentiality; and
(4) concerning matters within the scope of the corporate employee's du-
ties. While providing potential guidance in the dispute between advocates
of the control group test and the subject matter test, the Upjohn decision is
premised explicitly upon a specific set of factual occurrences. In light of
the traditional judicial tendency to decide privilege cases on a case-by-
case, fact-by-fact basis, the narrowness of the Court's holding ultimately
may crown the Upjohn decision prince of the privilege, but ruler of one.
William Kenneth C D~ipel
sion in Upjohn). But see In re LTV Sec. Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595, 601-02 (N.D. Tex. 1981)
(privilege applied as in Upjohn on "analogous" facts); SIPCA N. Am., Inc. v. Donaldson
Enterprises, Inc., 430 A.2d 262, 264 (N.J. 1981) (Upjohn cited as controlling in a dictum, but
decision based on contractual waiver of privilege).
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